Changes for page Grooming Gangs

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76	76	>¹ //The West Midlands report explicitly states 79% Asian, 12% white, 5% African-Caribbean, leaving ~~4% unaccounted; those may be of unknown ethnicity.//
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78		-These examples underscore both the over-representation of Asian (particularly Pakistani-heritage) suspects in many group grooming cases and the need for more robust data across all regions. Improved ethnic monitoring is now being introduced – in fact, one of Baroness Casey’s key recommendations in 2025 was to **mandate the collection of ethnicity and nationality data for all suspects in grooming cases**, a proposal the government accepted. Accurate data will help ensure frank discussion is based on facts, not bias or political spin.
	78	+These examples underscore both the over-representation of Asian (particularly Pakistani-heritage) suspects in many group grooming cases and the need for more robust data across all regions. Improved ethnic monitoring is now being introduced – in fact, one of Baroness Casey’s key recommendations in 2025 was to **mandate the collection of ethnicity and nationality data for all suspects in grooming cases**, a proposal the government accepted. Accurate data will help ensure frank discussion is based on facts, not bias or political spin. This is also not even a new phenomenon, there is evidence of this same kind of targeted sexual  abuse against British schoolgirls as far back as the 70s.{{footnote}}Bartholomew's Notes https://barthsnotes.com/2018/10/24/a-note-on-a-1975-grooming-case-from-rotherham/{{/footnote}} [[image:content||alt="Uploaded image" data-xwiki-image-style="thumbnail-clickable" width="200"]]
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80	80	== Responses and Investigations ==
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103	103	* **Poor Coordination and Record-Keeping:** Another failure was the sheer disarray of information within and between agencies. The grooming cases fell through the cracks of various systems – police, social services, schools, health – none of which shared data well. Perpetrators exploited this fragmentation. For instance, an offender banned in one town could simply move to another to continue offending, since intelligence wasn’t systematically passed on. Casey’s audit notes that police data on CSE was //“stored across multiple systems which do not communicate… within a force [or] between forces”//. Additionally, vital data like ethnicity, vehicle info (e.g., taxi license details), etc., were not collected or linked to suspect profiles. Basic policing work was sometimes lacking: victims or their parents would give police names, nicknames, car plate numbers of suspects, only for these not to be properly followed up or cross-referenced. When the Greater Manchester review (2020) revisited old files, they found numerous leads that had been dropped without investigation. Similarly, the 2013 Oxfordshire serious case review pointed out that even when social workers had lists of suspected exploiters, there was no effective mechanism to get police to act on that intelligence unless a victim made a formal complaint.
104	104	* **Lack of Accountability and Transparency:** Even after failures were identified, few officers or officials faced serious consequences. Often those in charge during the worst periods retired or moved jobs with pensions intact. In Rotherham, it took until after the Jay Report for the Chief Constable and others to step down under pressure. In other areas, inquiries noted a //“reluctance to accept the need for people to understand what happened”// and a defensive culture. Whistleblowers within the system (like some youth workers who raised alarms) were sometimes ostracized or silenced. This created a chilling effect where professionals feared speaking out. The failure to hold anyone accountable for so long eroded trust – victims and their families felt deeply betrayed. As Casey put it, //“institutions which bear responsibility for how these crimes were handled then fail to give victims the accountability they seek”//, resulting in victims feeling they have no choice but to call for independent inquiries. Only in recent years have we seen some consequences: e.g., South Yorkshire Police were heavily criticized, Greater Manchester Police’s Chief Constable publicly apologized, and a few officials (like a Rochdale social services director) faced disciplinary processes. But by and large, accountability has been elusive.
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106		-Summarizing these failures, the Casey audit talks of //“blindness, ignorance, prejudice, defensiveness and even good but misdirected intentions”// combining in a *//“collective failure to properly deter and prosecute offenders or to protect children from harm.”// In essence, many of the very agencies meant to safeguard children ended up **enabling the abusers**, whether through neglect, incompetence, or cowardice. The consequences were devastating: countless girls (and some boys) endured additional years of abuse that could have been stopped. Many victims later said that the **betrayal by authorities** – being called liars or “sluts” by those they begged for help – was as traumatizing as the abuse itself. It is only in hindsight that policing bodies have acknowledged these failures. There is now an effort to instill a culture of //“believe the victim, investigate thoroughly”// from the outset and to treat CSE with the same seriousness as, say, terrorism or homicide. Nonetheless, rebuilding trust will take time. As of 2025, one of the audit’s immediate calls is to **track down the perpetrators still at large**: //“there are far too many perpetrators walking freely today who have evaded justice for too long and we should seek to put that right,”// wrote Casey. This indicates that while strides have been made, significant law enforcement work remains to bring all perpetrators to book and to decisively end the era of impunity. This is also not even a new phenomenon, there is evidence of this same kind of targeted sexual  abuse against British schoolgirls as far back as the 70s.{{footnote}}Bartholomew's Notes https://barthsnotes.com/2018/10/24/a-note-on-a-1975-grooming-case-from-rotherham/{{/footnote}} [[image:content||alt="Uploaded image" data-xwiki-image-style-alignment="end" height="250" width="198"]]
	106	+Summarizing these failures, the Casey audit talks of //“blindness, ignorance, prejudice, defensiveness and even good but misdirected intentions”// combining in a *//“collective failure to properly deter and prosecute offenders or to protect children from harm.”// In essence, many of the very agencies meant to safeguard children ended up **enabling the abusers**, whether through neglect, incompetence, or cowardice. The consequences were devastating: countless girls (and some boys) endured additional years of abuse that could have been stopped. Many victims later said that the **betrayal by authorities** – being called liars or “sluts” by those they begged for help – was as traumatizing as the abuse itself. It is only in hindsight that policing bodies have acknowledged these failures. There is now an effort to instill a culture of //“believe the victim, investigate thoroughly”// from the outset and to treat CSE with the same seriousness as, say, terrorism or homicide. Nonetheless, rebuilding trust will take time. As of 2025, one of the audit’s immediate calls is to **track down the perpetrators still at large**: //“there are far too many perpetrators walking freely today who have evaded justice for too long and we should seek to put that right,”// wrote Casey. This indicates that while strides have been made, significant law enforcement work remains to bring all perpetrators to book and to decisively end the era of impunity.
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108	108	== ==
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